HR 10595 — 119th Congress

Stop Wall Street Looting Act

Introduced Sep 24, 2026 Open for voting
Note: Bill summaries and components on this page are AI-generated and may contain errors. Always consult the original bill text and official sources before relying on this information.
← Open legislation
Click Vote to enable simultaneous voting.

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Protect striking workers and expand labor rights

Adds new labor protections barring employers from permanently replacing striking workers, using lockouts to pressure bargaining, misclassifying workers, forcing employees into employer campaigns, and requires keeping current pay and terms during bargaining.

  • Population Scope High New unfair labor practice prohibitions apply to all employers and employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) — tens of millions of workers and employers nationwide.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; enforcement runs through existing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) processes.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates multiple new statutory unfair labor practice categories — including bans on permanent striker replacement, lockouts, misclassification, and coerced campaign participation — fundamentally expanding the substantive scope of the NLRA.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The new unfair labor practice prohibitions are mandatory statutory commands; no new agency discretion is granted beyond existing NLRB adjudicative authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Substantially expands NLRB's caseload by creating multiple new categories of cognizable unfair labor practice charges across all covered workplaces nationwide.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

Surtax on fund payments from controlled companies

Prevents investment firms from using tax credits to lower or cancel the new surtax, ensuring it is paid in full.

  • Population Scope Low Directly targets investment firms receiving payments from controlled portfolio companies — a narrow, specialized taxpayer class well under 1% of entities or individuals.
  • Budgetary Magnitude High Imposes a recurring surtax calibrated to bring total tax to the highest marginal rate on payments between investment firms and controlled entities, generating substantial ongoing federal revenue; credits are disallowed, ensuring full collection.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new IRC Section 59B surtax, revokes existing real-property interest-deduction elections, tightens interest deduction caps for leveraged firms, and disallows credits against the new liability — multiple new statutory mandates changing substantive tax law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High Grants the Treasury Secretary broad authority to issue anti-avoidance regulations, apply variable interest-deduction caps based on debt-to-equity ratios, and define the surtax's scope through regulatory guidance.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the IRS compliance monitoring of a specialized taxpayer class across recurring tax years, with anti-avoidance rules adding complexity to enforcement without standing up entirely new infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

Tax carried interest as ordinary income

Sets how partnership interests given as pay for services are valued and taxed, requiring recipients to include their fair market value as income in the year received.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects fund managers holding carried interest (investment services partnership interests) — a narrow, high-income class well under 1% of taxpayers.
  • Budgetary Magnitude High Recharacterizing capital gains, qualified dividends, and Section 1202 gains as ordinary income for carried interest holders eliminates a preferential tax rate that currently shelters tens of billions of dollars annually, generating substantial recurring federal revenue.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Adds new IRC Section 710 and amends Section 83 to fundamentally change the taxation of carried interest across all disposition, distribution, gift, and contribution scenarios — a comprehensive new statutory regime replacing existing law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The recharacterization rules are mandatory statutory commands with limited Secretary discretion on specific definitional edge cases; the core income treatment is non-discretionary.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the IRS tracking of cumulative recharacterized gains and losses, monitoring of gift and death transfers, and enforcement of elective contribution treatment across complex partnership structures.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Joint and several liability for PE funds

Makes private equity funds and their investors legally responsible for the debts and obligations of companies they control, including loans, fines, layoff penalties, and pension promises. Contracts trying to avoid this are overridden. Stops companies bought by private equity funds from closing a plant or conducting mass layoffs and then moving those jobs overseas. The Labor Department sets the rules. Lets workers and creditors sue in federal court to undo banned payouts and recover assets, with legal fees paid if they win. Transfers that break the rules are void and facilitators share liability. Voids any contract where a bought company shields its private equity owner from legal liability. This closes a loophole letting fund owners avoid responsibility through indemnification deals. Bars companies bought by private equity funds from paying out cash to owners for four years after purchase, then caps future payouts. This limits stripping value from acquired firms.

  • Population Scope Medium Directly affects private equity funds, their investors, and the portfolio companies they control — a significant but bounded commercial population, not the general public.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; liability shifts between private parties rather than engaging the federal treasury.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new statutory joint-and-several liability regime overriding existing contracts and limited-liability structures, adds a new private right of action, bans indemnification arrangements, and imposes hard capital distribution caps — a fundamental restructuring of the legal relationship between PE funds and portfolio companies.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The outsourcing ban delegates rulemaking to the Department of Labor (DOL) to define its scope, but the core liability and distribution restrictions are mandatory 'shall' requirements leaving little agency discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Establishes recurring private litigation by workers and creditors, imposes joint-and-several liability on facilitators, and requires ongoing monitoring of capital distributions — sustained case-by-case adjudication across all covered acquisitions.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Exclude REIT asset deals from health care programs

Bars any person or entity that sells or pledges assets to a real estate investment trust (REIT) from participating in federal health care programs. Deals made before enactment are protected.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only health care providers and entities that sell or pledge assets to REITs — a narrow subset of the health care sector.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Loss of eligibility for federal health care program payments (Medicare, Medicaid) represents a meaningful reduction in federal outlays for covered entities, though the population of affected entities is small.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new mandatory exclusion from federal health care programs tied to a specific financial transaction type — a new statutory prohibition with binding legal consequences for a defined class of entities.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Mandatory exclusion is automatic upon the triggering transaction; no agency discretion is granted over whether to impose or waive it.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) must identify and enforce exclusions across health care entities transacting with REITs, requiring ongoing transactional monitoring beyond existing exclusion administration.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Restrict executive pay during bankruptcy

Tightens limits on executive pay during bankruptcy by extending rules to more employees, banning performance bonuses, raising the proof standard, blocking pay if worker severance was cut, and requiring court approval benchmarked against peers. Lets bankruptcy trustees recover bonuses and incentive pay given to executives before filing, bars a common defense, and lets creditor committees pursue recovery if the trustee does not act. Treats unpaid wages and benefits owed after a bankruptcy filing as costs chargeable against secured lenders' collateral, so workers are paid ahead of those lenders for these amounts. Gives back pay, penalties, and damages for labor and employment law violations top-priority status in bankruptcy, and clarifies how layoff-notice penalties are counted.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects executives, senior managers, and consultants of bankrupt companies — a narrow population within an already limited set of bankruptcy cases.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Treating post-petition employee wages as charges against secured collateral reallocates substantial estate value from secured lenders to workers; the aggregate dollar impact across all bankruptcy cases is meaningful but not transformative at the federal scale.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Expands the class of restricted compensation recipients, creates new clawback authority, eliminates a common defense, grants creditor committees new standing, and adds a proportionality requirement for court approval — a fundamental restructuring of bankruptcy executive compensation law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Raises the evidentiary standard to 'clear and convincing' and requires courts to benchmark compensation against industry peers, guiding but not eliminating judicial discretion in approval decisions.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Requires prior court approval hearings for all covered compensation, empowers creditor committees and parties in interest to bring clawback actions, and mandates proportionality analysis — creating recurring adjudicative burdens in every qualifying bankruptcy.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Annual public disclosures by private funds

Requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to make private equity funds that control companies publicly report detailed financial, ownership, debt, fee, and political spending information each year. Bars investment advisers from requiring clients to waive fiduciary duties and requires private fund general partners to offer the same terms to all limited partners. Treats private fund assets as pension plan assets and makes fund managers legally responsible fiduciaries when pension plans invest, subjecting them to retirement law duties and liability.

  • Population Scope Low Directly imposes obligations on controlling private funds, their general partners, and investment advisers — a narrow set of financial entities, though pension beneficiaries are indirectly protected.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; compliance costs fall on private funds rather than the federal government.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate annual public financial disclosures, extends ERISA fiduciary duties to private fund managers, bans fiduciary waiver requirements, and imposes equal-treatment obligations on general partners — multiple new substantive statutory mandates restructuring the regulatory relationship between funds and investors.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium SEC must act within one year but retains discretion over the form and detail of disclosure rules; the ERISA and equal-treatment provisions are mandatory commands.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Creates new SEC rulemaking obligations, annual reporting and review burdens across all qualifying funds, ERISA enforcement exposure for fund managers, and litigation risk from the equal-terms requirement — sustained multi-agency compliance and enforcement load.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations

Remove REIT dividends from pass-through deduction

Removes real estate investment trust (REIT) dividends from the 20 percent pass-through deduction, raising the tax on income from REIT investments.

  • Population Scope Medium REIT investors span a broad retail and institutional investor base, including millions of individual taxpayers holding REITs directly or through funds — potentially 10–25% of U.S. taxpayers are affected.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Eliminating the 20% pass-through deduction on qualified REIT dividends increases taxable income for a broad investor class on a recurring basis, generating meaningful but not transformative additional federal revenue.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends IRC Section 199A to remove an entire category of income from a statutory deduction — a new substantive tax mandate binding all affected taxpayers.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendment is self-executing; no agency discretion is granted over its application.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Enforcement relies on existing the IRS individual income tax administration with no new compliance infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Protect jobs in bankruptcy asset sales

Requires bankruptcy courts to weigh job preservation when approving company sales, makes buyers disclose workforce impact plans, and lets courts enforce those commitments. Gives people holding unused gift cards a priority claim in bankruptcy, up to $1,800 each, when a merchant goes bankrupt, placing them alongside deposit holders.

  • Population Scope Medium Workers at companies sold through bankruptcy and consumers holding gift cards from bankrupt merchants are a broader-than-typical bankruptcy population; gift card holders in particular number in the tens of millions across major retail bankruptcies.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the provisions reallocate private bankruptcy estate assets between creditor classes.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Imposes new statutory duties on bankruptcy courts to weight job preservation in asset sales, creates a new buyer disclosure obligation enforceable by injunction, and establishes a new seventh-priority unsecured claim category for gift card holders — new substantive statutory entitlements.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Courts must give 'substantial weight' to job preservation but retain discretion in evaluating bids and enforcing buyer disclosures through injunctive or other relief.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires courts to evaluate workforce impact disclosures in every qualifying asset sale and retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance, adding recurring procedural steps to bankruptcy sale processes.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations

End health care rent exclusion for REIT subsidiaries

Removes a special tax rule that let real estate investment trust (REIT) subsidiaries collect rent from health care properties without losing REIT tax status.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects only REITs holding qualified health care properties through taxable REIT subsidiaries — a narrow segment of the REIT industry.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Removing the special rent-exclusion rule changes REIT tax qualification, potentially disqualifying affected structures and increasing federal tax revenue, but the affected population is small enough to limit aggregate magnitude.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends IRC Section 856(d)(8)(B) to eliminate a special substantive tax rule, changing the legal qualification standard for an entire class of REIT arrangements going forward.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendment is self-executing with no agency discretion over its application; the IRS administers under existing authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Enforcement relies on existing the IRS REIT qualification review processes with no new infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Stronger worker wage and benefit claims in bankruptcy

Strengthens workers' claims in bankruptcy by doubling the priority cap for unpaid wages and benefits to $20,000, removing time limits on wage claims, and treating severance as earned at layoff.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects employees of bankrupt companies — a population limited to those whose employers file for bankruptcy in any given period, well under 1% of U.S. workers at any time.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Raising priority caps to $20,000, removing the 180-day lookback, and adding post-petition obligations as administrative expenses materially shift how bankruptcy estate funds are distributed, increasing the share flowing to workers at the expense of other creditors.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends the Bankruptcy Code to raise statutory dollar caps, eliminate a time limit on priority claims, and create new administrative-expense categories — new substantive statutory entitlements for a defined class of claimants.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendments are self-executing statutory mandates; bankruptcy courts apply them without new discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Increases the volume and complexity of priority claim disputes in bankruptcy proceedings, requiring case-by-case adjudication of expanded worker claims against estate assets.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement

Creditor committee power over insider actions

Gives creditor committees power to investigate conflicted company officers and to bring or settle lawsuits against insiders when company managers may be compromised. Removes legal protection that shielded buyout-related payments from being undone in bankruptcy. Trustees can now reverse transfers tied to a change in company control. Creates a presumption that payments tied to a company's change in control were made while insolvent and unfairly, making them easier to reverse in bankruptcy. Extends the time window for reversing fraudulent transfers tied to a change in company control to fifteen years, far longer than current limits. Requires courts to treat separate but connected steps of a deal as one transaction when deciding whether transfers can be undone in bankruptcy.

  • Population Scope Low Affects creditor committees, insiders, and parties in bankruptcy proceedings involving change-in-control transactions — a narrow commercial population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; redistributes recoveries among private parties in bankruptcy estates.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Removes existing safe-harbor protections, creates a new presumption of insolvency, extends the lookback period to 15 years, and grants creditor committees new trustee-equivalent standing to sue — a substantive restructuring of bankruptcy avoidance law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Courts retain discretion in applying the step-transaction doctrine and evaluating the insolvency presumption, but the 15-year lookback and safe-harbor removal are mandatory.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Expands the class of parties empowered to bring avoidance actions and lengthens the window for litigation, increasing caseload through recurring adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Remove commercial lease assumption rule in bankruptcy

Removes a bankruptcy provision governing how debtors handle commercial real estate lease assumptions, changing the rules for commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects commercial landlords and debtors in bankruptcy proceedings with commercial real estate leases — a narrow specialized population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the change affects private contractual rights in bankruptcy proceedings.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Strikes a specific substantive provision of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) governing commercial lease assumption, eliminating an existing statutory rule and changing the legal framework for commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The repeal is self-executing with no new agency or judicial discretion granted.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Removal of the provision reduces rather than increases the complexity of commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy, with no new enforcement infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Risk retention for CDO managers

Requires managers of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to hold a share of the credit risk in deals they manage, treating them like other securitizers under securities law. Makes it unlawful to willfully try to dodge any part of this law through agreements, transactions, or how a business is structured.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects CDO managers — a specialized subset of financial market participants well under 1% of entities or individuals.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the provision imposes private risk-retention obligations on market participants.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Expands the statutory definition of 'securitizer' under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include CDO managers and creates a standalone anti-evasion prohibition — new substantive statutory mandates with binding legal consequences.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low CDO managers are mandatory securitizers under self-executing interpretive rules; no new discretion is granted to agencies beyond existing risk-retention enforcement authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Extends existing risk-retention compliance and examination requirements to CDO managers and adds an anti-evasion prohibition requiring ongoing structural review of covered arrangements.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for no-self-charged carry and management fee provisions

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, an interest shall not fail to be treated as satisfying the requirement of paragraph (1)(A) merely because the allocations made by the partnership to such interest do not reflect the cost of services described in subsection (c)(2) which are provided…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to a narrow sub-class of investment services partnership interest holders whose allocations do not reflect the cost of their services — a fraction of an already narrow taxpayer population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits the revenue effect of the carried interest rules for a small defined class; the aggregate dollar impact is minimal.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Creates a definitional safe harbor constraining when an interest fails to satisfy the investment services partnership interest requirements — a procedural boundary on a new substantive rule rather than an independent mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define exceptions and otherwise limit the safe harbor through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance complexity for a narrow class by clarifying that certain allocations do not trigger recharacterization; no new enforcement infrastructure is required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for domestic C corporations

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, in the case of a domestic C corporation— subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to any item allocated to such corporation with respect to any investment services partnership interest (or to any gain or loss with respect to the disposition of such an…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to domestic C corporations holding investment services partnership interests — a narrow subset of corporate taxpayers in an already limited category.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest provisions by exempting C corporation allocations and dispositions; the affected class is small relative to total carried interest income.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Carves a corporate-taxpayer class out of the new investment services partnership interest recharacterization rules — a scope limitation on a new substantive mandate rather than an independent statutory command.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define the exception's scope and override it through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance obligations for qualifying C corporations by exempting them from carried interest recharacterization; no new enforcement burden is created.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for publicly traded partnerships

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, in the case of an exchange of an interest in a publicly traded partnership (as defined in section 7704) to which subsection (a) applies— this section shall be applied without regard to subsections (a)(3), (b)(1)(A)(iii), and (f)(3), and such…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to exchanges of interests in publicly traded partnerships subject to the carried interest rules — a narrow subset of partnership interest holders.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest rules for a defined class of publicly traded partnership exchanges; the fiscal impact is modest given the narrow population.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Modifies application of several sub-provisions of the carried interest recharacterization rules for publicly traded partnership exchanges — a procedural scope adjustment rather than a new substantive mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define the exception's application through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance complexity for affected publicly traded partnership interest holders; no new enforcement obligations are created.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Grandfather for pre-enactment REIT pledges

Protects people and entities that pledged assets to a real estate investment trust (REIT) before this law takes effect from the new health care program exclusion.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only entities with REIT collateral agreements predating enactment — a small, fixed, and shrinking cohort.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the exemption limits foregone program payments rather than directing spending.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Carves out a defined class from a new mandatory exclusion, constraining the substantive reach of the exclusion rule through a procedural boundary — a scope limitation rather than an independent substantive mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The grandfather protection is self-executing based on a fixed date; no agency discretion is involved in its application.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces enforcement burden by exempting a defined pre-enactment class from the new exclusion, requiring only date verification rather than substantive review.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it, continuously shielding the grandfathered class.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for certain capital interests

In the case of any portion of an investment services partnership interest which is a qualified capital interest, all items of gain and loss (and any dividends) which are allocated to such qualified capital interest shall not be taken into account under subsection (a) if— allocations of items are…

  • Population Scope Low Carves out a narrow sub-class of partnership interest holders with qualified capital interests from the carried interest recharacterization rules — a fraction of an already small taxpayer population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest provisions by exempting a defined class of allocations; the excluded amounts are a subset of an already narrow tax base.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a definitional boundary constraining the scope of a new substantive tax rule — a scope limitation rather than an independent statutory mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The Secretary retains authority to define and apply the qualified capital interest exception through regulatory guidance.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low The exception reduces the compliance burden for qualifying interest holders rather than adding new enforcement obligations.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for qualified capital interests

A rule similar to the rule of section 710(d) shall apply for purposes of clause (i).

No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for qualified capital interests

A rule similar to the rule of section 710(d) shall apply for purposes of applying paragraph (1)(B).

No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Disclosures for funds receiving public money

Requires investment funds that get federal or state government money to publicly report detailed financial and workforce information, including pay ratios and who owns them. Bars funds that receive government money from buying other companies or paying out to shareholders for two years after getting the funds.

No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Quarterly Form PF reporting of fund investments

Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require private fund advisers to report their investments and loans every quarter, giving regulators more frequent data. Requires investment advisers to give prospective investors detailed information about all funds they manage, including performance, portfolio company bankruptcies, regulatory actions, and exit strategies.

No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for qualified capital interests

A rule similar to the rule of section 710(d) shall apply for purposes of clause (i).

No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for qualified capital interests

A rule similar to the rule of section 710(d) shall apply for purposes of applying paragraph (1)(B).

No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Disclosures for funds receiving public money

Requires investment funds that get federal or state government money to publicly report detailed financial and workforce information, including pay ratios and who owns them. Bars funds that receive government money from buying other companies or paying out to shareholders for two years after getting the funds.

No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Quarterly Form PF reporting of fund investments

Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require private fund advisers to report their investments and loans every quarter, giving regulators more frequent data. Requires investment advisers to give prospective investors detailed information about all funds they manage, including performance, portfolio company bankruptcies, regulatory actions, and exit strategies.

No signal yet

Summary

This bill changes the rules for private equity firms, hedge funds, and the companies they buy. It aims to stop investors from profiting while the companies they control fail. It makes fund owners legally responsible for the debts of companies they control, limits how much money they can pull out, and taxes certain payments heavily. Among other elements, the bill * makes fund owners jointly liable for debts, penalties, and pension obligations of controlled companies; * limits cash payouts and bans sending jobs overseas after mass layoffs; * taxes carried interest and certain fund payments as ordinary income, ending lower rates; * strengthens worker and consumer protections in bankruptcy, including wages and gift cards; * adds new labor protections for striking workers; * restricts executive pay during bankruptcy; and * requires funds to publicly disclose detailed financial and political information.

AI-generated summary, pending human review.

Full bill text rendering is coming soon.

In the meantime, read the full text on Congress.gov ↗.

Version Event Date User support Your vote Roll calls
Original
Initial publication
Sep 24, 2026
Sep 24, 2026 No votes yet — —

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Protect striking workers and expand labor rights

Adds new labor protections barring employers from permanently replacing striking workers, using lockouts to pressure bargaining, misclassifying workers, forcing employees into employer campaigns, and requires keeping current pay and terms during bargaining.

  • Population Scope High New unfair labor practice prohibitions apply to all employers and employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) — tens of millions of workers and employers nationwide.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; enforcement runs through existing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) processes.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates multiple new statutory unfair labor practice categories — including bans on permanent striker replacement, lockouts, misclassification, and coerced campaign participation — fundamentally expanding the substantive scope of the NLRA.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The new unfair labor practice prohibitions are mandatory statutory commands; no new agency discretion is granted beyond existing NLRB adjudicative authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Substantially expands NLRB's caseload by creating multiple new categories of cognizable unfair labor practice charges across all covered workplaces nationwide.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Protect striking workers and expand labor rights

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

Surtax on fund payments from controlled companies

Prevents investment firms from using tax credits to lower or cancel the new surtax, ensuring it is paid in full.

  • Population Scope Low Directly targets investment firms receiving payments from controlled portfolio companies — a narrow, specialized taxpayer class well under 1% of entities or individuals.
  • Budgetary Magnitude High Imposes a recurring surtax calibrated to bring total tax to the highest marginal rate on payments between investment firms and controlled entities, generating substantial ongoing federal revenue; credits are disallowed, ensuring full collection.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new IRC Section 59B surtax, revokes existing real-property interest-deduction elections, tightens interest deduction caps for leveraged firms, and disallows credits against the new liability — multiple new statutory mandates changing substantive tax law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High Grants the Treasury Secretary broad authority to issue anti-avoidance regulations, apply variable interest-deduction caps based on debt-to-equity ratios, and define the surtax's scope through regulatory guidance.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the IRS compliance monitoring of a specialized taxpayer class across recurring tax years, with anti-avoidance rules adding complexity to enforcement without standing up entirely new infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations

Surtax on fund payments from controlled companies

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

Tax carried interest as ordinary income

Sets how partnership interests given as pay for services are valued and taxed, requiring recipients to include their fair market value as income in the year received.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects fund managers holding carried interest (investment services partnership interests) — a narrow, high-income class well under 1% of taxpayers.
  • Budgetary Magnitude High Recharacterizing capital gains, qualified dividends, and Section 1202 gains as ordinary income for carried interest holders eliminates a preferential tax rate that currently shelters tens of billions of dollars annually, generating substantial recurring federal revenue.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Adds new IRC Section 710 and amends Section 83 to fundamentally change the taxation of carried interest across all disposition, distribution, gift, and contribution scenarios — a comprehensive new statutory regime replacing existing law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The recharacterization rules are mandatory statutory commands with limited Secretary discretion on specific definitional edge cases; the core income treatment is non-discretionary.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the IRS tracking of cumulative recharacterized gains and losses, monitoring of gift and death transfers, and enforcement of elective contribution treatment across complex partnership structures.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations

Tax carried interest as ordinary income

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Joint and several liability for PE funds

Makes private equity funds and their investors legally responsible for the debts and obligations of companies they control, including loans, fines, layoff penalties, and pension promises. Contracts trying to avoid this are overridden. Stops companies bought by private equity funds from closing a plant or conducting mass layoffs and then moving those jobs overseas. The Labor Department sets the rules. Lets workers and creditors sue in federal court to undo banned payouts and recover assets, with legal fees paid if they win. Transfers that break the rules are void and facilitators share liability. Voids any contract where a bought company shields its private equity owner from legal liability. This closes a loophole letting fund owners avoid responsibility through indemnification deals. Bars companies bought by private equity funds from paying out cash to owners for four years after purchase, then caps future payouts. This limits stripping value from acquired firms.

  • Population Scope Medium Directly affects private equity funds, their investors, and the portfolio companies they control — a significant but bounded commercial population, not the general public.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; liability shifts between private parties rather than engaging the federal treasury.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new statutory joint-and-several liability regime overriding existing contracts and limited-liability structures, adds a new private right of action, bans indemnification arrangements, and imposes hard capital distribution caps — a fundamental restructuring of the legal relationship between PE funds and portfolio companies.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The outsourcing ban delegates rulemaking to the Department of Labor (DOL) to define its scope, but the core liability and distribution restrictions are mandatory 'shall' requirements leaving little agency discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Establishes recurring private litigation by workers and creditors, imposes joint-and-several liability on facilitators, and requires ongoing monitoring of capital distributions — sustained case-by-case adjudication across all covered acquisitions.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Joint and several liability for PE funds

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Exclude REIT asset deals from health care programs

Bars any person or entity that sells or pledges assets to a real estate investment trust (REIT) from participating in federal health care programs. Deals made before enactment are protected.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only health care providers and entities that sell or pledge assets to REITs — a narrow subset of the health care sector.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Loss of eligibility for federal health care program payments (Medicare, Medicaid) represents a meaningful reduction in federal outlays for covered entities, though the population of affected entities is small.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new mandatory exclusion from federal health care programs tied to a specific financial transaction type — a new statutory prohibition with binding legal consequences for a defined class of entities.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Mandatory exclusion is automatic upon the triggering transaction; no agency discretion is granted over whether to impose or waive it.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) must identify and enforce exclusions across health care entities transacting with REITs, requiring ongoing transactional monitoring beyond existing exclusion administration.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Exclude REIT asset deals from health care programs

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Restrict executive pay during bankruptcy

Tightens limits on executive pay during bankruptcy by extending rules to more employees, banning performance bonuses, raising the proof standard, blocking pay if worker severance was cut, and requiring court approval benchmarked against peers. Lets bankruptcy trustees recover bonuses and incentive pay given to executives before filing, bars a common defense, and lets creditor committees pursue recovery if the trustee does not act. Treats unpaid wages and benefits owed after a bankruptcy filing as costs chargeable against secured lenders' collateral, so workers are paid ahead of those lenders for these amounts. Gives back pay, penalties, and damages for labor and employment law violations top-priority status in bankruptcy, and clarifies how layoff-notice penalties are counted.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects executives, senior managers, and consultants of bankrupt companies — a narrow population within an already limited set of bankruptcy cases.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Treating post-petition employee wages as charges against secured collateral reallocates substantial estate value from secured lenders to workers; the aggregate dollar impact across all bankruptcy cases is meaningful but not transformative at the federal scale.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Expands the class of restricted compensation recipients, creates new clawback authority, eliminates a common defense, grants creditor committees new standing, and adds a proportionality requirement for court approval — a fundamental restructuring of bankruptcy executive compensation law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Raises the evidentiary standard to 'clear and convincing' and requires courts to benchmark compensation against industry peers, guiding but not eliminating judicial discretion in approval decisions.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Requires prior court approval hearings for all covered compensation, empowers creditor committees and parties in interest to bring clawback actions, and mandates proportionality analysis — creating recurring adjudicative burdens in every qualifying bankruptcy.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Restrict executive pay during bankruptcy

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Annual public disclosures by private funds

Requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to make private equity funds that control companies publicly report detailed financial, ownership, debt, fee, and political spending information each year. Bars investment advisers from requiring clients to waive fiduciary duties and requires private fund general partners to offer the same terms to all limited partners. Treats private fund assets as pension plan assets and makes fund managers legally responsible fiduciaries when pension plans invest, subjecting them to retirement law duties and liability.

  • Population Scope Low Directly imposes obligations on controlling private funds, their general partners, and investment advisers — a narrow set of financial entities, though pension beneficiaries are indirectly protected.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; compliance costs fall on private funds rather than the federal government.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate annual public financial disclosures, extends ERISA fiduciary duties to private fund managers, bans fiduciary waiver requirements, and imposes equal-treatment obligations on general partners — multiple new substantive statutory mandates restructuring the regulatory relationship between funds and investors.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium SEC must act within one year but retains discretion over the form and detail of disclosure rules; the ERISA and equal-treatment provisions are mandatory commands.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Creates new SEC rulemaking obligations, annual reporting and review burdens across all qualifying funds, ERISA enforcement exposure for fund managers, and litigation risk from the equal-terms requirement — sustained multi-agency compliance and enforcement load.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Annual public disclosures by private funds

Funding / Appropriations

Remove REIT dividends from pass-through deduction

Removes real estate investment trust (REIT) dividends from the 20 percent pass-through deduction, raising the tax on income from REIT investments.

  • Population Scope Medium REIT investors span a broad retail and institutional investor base, including millions of individual taxpayers holding REITs directly or through funds — potentially 10–25% of U.S. taxpayers are affected.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Eliminating the 20% pass-through deduction on qualified REIT dividends increases taxable income for a broad investor class on a recurring basis, generating meaningful but not transformative additional federal revenue.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends IRC Section 199A to remove an entire category of income from a statutory deduction — a new substantive tax mandate binding all affected taxpayers.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendment is self-executing; no agency discretion is granted over its application.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Enforcement relies on existing the IRS individual income tax administration with no new compliance infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations (optional)

Remove REIT dividends from pass-through deduction

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Protect jobs in bankruptcy asset sales

Requires bankruptcy courts to weigh job preservation when approving company sales, makes buyers disclose workforce impact plans, and lets courts enforce those commitments. Gives people holding unused gift cards a priority claim in bankruptcy, up to $1,800 each, when a merchant goes bankrupt, placing them alongside deposit holders.

  • Population Scope Medium Workers at companies sold through bankruptcy and consumers holding gift cards from bankrupt merchants are a broader-than-typical bankruptcy population; gift card holders in particular number in the tens of millions across major retail bankruptcies.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the provisions reallocate private bankruptcy estate assets between creditor classes.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Imposes new statutory duties on bankruptcy courts to weight job preservation in asset sales, creates a new buyer disclosure obligation enforceable by injunction, and establishes a new seventh-priority unsecured claim category for gift card holders — new substantive statutory entitlements.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Courts must give 'substantial weight' to job preservation but retain discretion in evaluating bids and enforcing buyer disclosures through injunctive or other relief.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires courts to evaluate workforce impact disclosures in every qualifying asset sale and retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance, adding recurring procedural steps to bankruptcy sale processes.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Protect jobs in bankruptcy asset sales

Funding / Appropriations

End health care rent exclusion for REIT subsidiaries

Removes a special tax rule that let real estate investment trust (REIT) subsidiaries collect rent from health care properties without losing REIT tax status.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects only REITs holding qualified health care properties through taxable REIT subsidiaries — a narrow segment of the REIT industry.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Removing the special rent-exclusion rule changes REIT tax qualification, potentially disqualifying affected structures and increasing federal tax revenue, but the affected population is small enough to limit aggregate magnitude.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends IRC Section 856(d)(8)(B) to eliminate a special substantive tax rule, changing the legal qualification standard for an entire class of REIT arrangements going forward.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendment is self-executing with no agency discretion over its application; the IRS administers under existing authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Enforcement relies on existing the IRS REIT qualification review processes with no new infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations (optional)

End health care rent exclusion for REIT subsidiaries

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Stronger worker wage and benefit claims in bankruptcy

Strengthens workers' claims in bankruptcy by doubling the priority cap for unpaid wages and benefits to $20,000, removing time limits on wage claims, and treating severance as earned at layoff.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects employees of bankrupt companies — a population limited to those whose employers file for bankruptcy in any given period, well under 1% of U.S. workers at any time.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Raising priority caps to $20,000, removing the 180-day lookback, and adding post-petition obligations as administrative expenses materially shift how bankruptcy estate funds are distributed, increasing the share flowing to workers at the expense of other creditors.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends the Bankruptcy Code to raise statutory dollar caps, eliminate a time limit on priority claims, and create new administrative-expense categories — new substantive statutory entitlements for a defined class of claimants.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The amendments are self-executing statutory mandates; bankruptcy courts apply them without new discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Increases the volume and complexity of priority claim disputes in bankruptcy proceedings, requiring case-by-case adjudication of expanded worker claims against estate assets.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Stronger worker wage and benefit claims in bankruptcy

Implementation & Enforcement

Creditor committee power over insider actions

Gives creditor committees power to investigate conflicted company officers and to bring or settle lawsuits against insiders when company managers may be compromised. Removes legal protection that shielded buyout-related payments from being undone in bankruptcy. Trustees can now reverse transfers tied to a change in company control. Creates a presumption that payments tied to a company's change in control were made while insolvent and unfairly, making them easier to reverse in bankruptcy. Extends the time window for reversing fraudulent transfers tied to a change in company control to fifteen years, far longer than current limits. Requires courts to treat separate but connected steps of a deal as one transaction when deciding whether transfers can be undone in bankruptcy.

  • Population Scope Low Affects creditor committees, insiders, and parties in bankruptcy proceedings involving change-in-control transactions — a narrow commercial population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; redistributes recoveries among private parties in bankruptcy estates.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Removes existing safe-harbor protections, creates a new presumption of insolvency, extends the lookback period to 15 years, and grants creditor committees new trustee-equivalent standing to sue — a substantive restructuring of bankruptcy avoidance law.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Courts retain discretion in applying the step-transaction doctrine and evaluating the insolvency presumption, but the 15-year lookback and safe-harbor removal are mandatory.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Expands the class of parties empowered to bring avoidance actions and lengthens the window for litigation, increasing caseload through recurring adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement (optional)

Creditor committee power over insider actions

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Remove commercial lease assumption rule in bankruptcy

Removes a bankruptcy provision governing how debtors handle commercial real estate lease assumptions, changing the rules for commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects commercial landlords and debtors in bankruptcy proceedings with commercial real estate leases — a narrow specialized population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the change affects private contractual rights in bankruptcy proceedings.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Strikes a specific substantive provision of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) governing commercial lease assumption, eliminating an existing statutory rule and changing the legal framework for commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The repeal is self-executing with no new agency or judicial discretion granted.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Removal of the provision reduces rather than increases the complexity of commercial lease disputes in bankruptcy, with no new enforcement infrastructure required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Remove commercial lease assumption rule in bankruptcy

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Risk retention for CDO managers

Requires managers of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to hold a share of the credit risk in deals they manage, treating them like other securitizers under securities law. Makes it unlawful to willfully try to dodge any part of this law through agreements, transactions, or how a business is structured.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects CDO managers — a specialized subset of financial market participants well under 1% of entities or individuals.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the provision imposes private risk-retention obligations on market participants.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Expands the statutory definition of 'securitizer' under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include CDO managers and creates a standalone anti-evasion prohibition — new substantive statutory mandates with binding legal consequences.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low CDO managers are mandatory securitizers under self-executing interpretive rules; no new discretion is granted to agencies beyond existing risk-retention enforcement authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Extends existing risk-retention compliance and examination requirements to CDO managers and adds an anti-evasion prohibition requiring ongoing structural review of covered arrangements.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes (optional)

Risk retention for CDO managers

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for no-self-charged carry and management fee provisions

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, an interest shall not fail to be treated as satisfying the requirement of paragraph (1)(A) merely because the allocations made by the partnership to such interest do not reflect the cost of services described in subsection (c)(2) which are provided…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to a narrow sub-class of investment services partnership interest holders whose allocations do not reflect the cost of their services — a fraction of an already narrow taxpayer population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits the revenue effect of the carried interest rules for a small defined class; the aggregate dollar impact is minimal.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Creates a definitional safe harbor constraining when an interest fails to satisfy the investment services partnership interest requirements — a procedural boundary on a new substantive rule rather than an independent mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define exceptions and otherwise limit the safe harbor through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance complexity for a narrow class by clarifying that certain allocations do not trigger recharacterization; no new enforcement infrastructure is required.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility (optional)

Exception for no-self-charged carry and management fee provisions

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for domestic C corporations

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, in the case of a domestic C corporation— subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to any item allocated to such corporation with respect to any investment services partnership interest (or to any gain or loss with respect to the disposition of such an…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to domestic C corporations holding investment services partnership interests — a narrow subset of corporate taxpayers in an already limited category.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest provisions by exempting C corporation allocations and dispositions; the affected class is small relative to total carried interest income.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Carves a corporate-taxpayer class out of the new investment services partnership interest recharacterization rules — a scope limitation on a new substantive mandate rather than an independent statutory command.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define the exception's scope and override it through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance obligations for qualifying C corporations by exempting them from carried interest recharacterization; no new enforcement burden is created.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility (optional)

Exception for domestic C corporations

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for publicly traded partnerships

Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, in the case of an exchange of an interest in a publicly traded partnership (as defined in section 7704) to which subsection (a) applies— this section shall be applied without regard to subsections (a)(3), (b)(1)(A)(iii), and (f)(3), and such…

  • Population Scope Low Applies only to exchanges of interests in publicly traded partnerships subject to the carried interest rules — a narrow subset of partnership interest holders.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest rules for a defined class of publicly traded partnership exchanges; the fiscal impact is modest given the narrow population.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Modifies application of several sub-provisions of the carried interest recharacterization rules for publicly traded partnership exchanges — a procedural scope adjustment rather than a new substantive mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High The Secretary retains broad authority to define the exception's application through regulatory guidance ('except as otherwise provided by the Secretary').
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces compliance complexity for affected publicly traded partnership interest holders; no new enforcement obligations are created.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility (optional)

Exception for publicly traded partnerships

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Grandfather for pre-enactment REIT pledges

Protects people and entities that pledged assets to a real estate investment trust (REIT) before this law takes effect from the new health care program exclusion.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only entities with REIT collateral agreements predating enactment — a small, fixed, and shrinking cohort.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No federal funds are authorized or appropriated; the exemption limits foregone program payments rather than directing spending.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Carves out a defined class from a new mandatory exclusion, constraining the substantive reach of the exclusion rule through a procedural boundary — a scope limitation rather than an independent substantive mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The grandfather protection is self-executing based on a fixed date; no agency discretion is involved in its application.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Reduces enforcement burden by exempting a defined pre-enactment class from the new exclusion, requiring only date verification rather than substantive review.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it, continuously shielding the grandfathered class.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility (optional)

Grandfather for pre-enactment REIT pledges

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception for certain capital interests

In the case of any portion of an investment services partnership interest which is a qualified capital interest, all items of gain and loss (and any dividends) which are allocated to such qualified capital interest shall not be taken into account under subsection (a) if— allocations of items are…

  • Population Scope Low Carves out a narrow sub-class of partnership interest holders with qualified capital interests from the carried interest recharacterization rules — a fraction of an already small taxpayer population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low Limits revenue gain from the carried interest provisions by exempting a defined class of allocations; the excluded amounts are a subset of an already narrow tax base.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a definitional boundary constraining the scope of a new substantive tax rule — a scope limitation rather than an independent statutory mandate.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The Secretary retains authority to define and apply the qualified capital interest exception through regulatory guidance.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low The exception reduces the compliance burden for qualifying interest holders rather than adding new enforcement obligations.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility (optional)

Exception for certain capital interests