HR 10792 — 119th Congress

FTC Whistleblower Act of 2026

Introduced Oct 9, 2026 Open for voting
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Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Anti-retaliation protections and remedies for whistleblowers

Prohibits employers and covered entities from retaliating against people who report suspected legal violations, take part in investigations, or refuse to participate in unlawful conduct. Whistleblowers who are harmed can sue in federal court for reinstatement, triple back pay, and attorney's fees.

  • Population Scope Medium Directly affects the workforce of all covered entities subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction — a large employer class — plus individual employees who report violations, reaching tens of millions of workers but well under the full U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; litigation costs fall on private parties and existing federal courts, with no new federal spending.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates new substantive law: a federal anti-retaliation prohibition, a private right of action with treble-back-pay remedy, and voidance of arbitration agreements and restrictive covenants — all new statutory mandates binding the regulated population.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Courts apply mandatory 'shall' remedies (reinstatement, triple back pay, fees), leaving little discretion once a violation is established.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Requires standing up recurring federal-court adjudication of retaliation claims, with jury trials, specified burdens of proof, and multi-remedy proceedings — sustained case-by-case enforcement infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Core Policy Mechanism Top 5

Whistleblower monetary award program (10–30%)

Requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to pay whistleblowers 10–30% of sanctions collected when their tips lead to a successful enforcement action. Sets criteria for award amounts, allows anonymous claims with counsel, bars false-information claimants, and grants appeals to federal court.

  • Population Scope Low Directly benefits only individuals who proactively submit original information leading to a successful Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement action — a narrow, self-selected group far smaller than 10% of the U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Awards of 10–30% of collected sanctions create a recurring federal payment obligation, though actual outlays depend on enforcement volume and are capped indirectly by the $500 million fund balance limit.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new enforceable statutory entitlement to monetary compensation from a federal agency, with specific award criteria, denial rules, and appellate review rights — a new class of substantive legal rights.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium FTC must pay awards within the mandatory 10–30% band but retains judgment in setting the specific percentage based on enumerated factors, blending mandatory obligation with structured discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires FTC to conduct individualized award determinations, process anonymous claims with counsel verification, and defend appellate review in federal courts of appeals — recurring adjudicative load.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement Top 5

FTC rulemaking authority to implement the Act

Authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to write rules, through public notice-and-comment, to carry out the whistleblower protection and award program. This gives the FTC flexibility to fill in operational details not spelled out in the legislation.

  • Population Scope Medium Rules issued under this authority will bind the full population of covered entities and potential whistleblowers subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction — a large but not universally nationwide set of actors.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; the provision confers rulemaking authority only.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Grants FTC a new statutory rulemaking authority — a procedural and operational delegation that shapes how substantive rights operate in practice rather than directly creating new substantive rights itself.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High Broadly authorizes FTC to write any rules 'necessary to carry out' the Act, with no subject-matter limits beyond APA notice-and-comment requirements, conferring wide-ranging delegated authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Triggers ongoing notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings and compliance obligations for covered entities as rules are issued — a recurring but agency-managed administrative burden.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

FTC Consumer Protection Fund establishment

Creates a dedicated Treasury fund, capped at $500 million, financed by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) monetary sanctions to pay whistleblower awards without further congressional appropriation. Fund balances may be invested in U.S. government obligations.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects only whistleblower award recipients and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as administering agency — a narrow population far below 10% of the U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Creates a permanent, indefinite appropriation funded by FTC-collected sanctions and capped at $500 million, enabling award payments without further congressional action — a material but bounded fiscal commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a new dedicated Treasury fund with a statutory cap and self-executing spending authority — a significant fiscal structure but one that is procedural and administrative rather than creating new substantive rights.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Fund mechanics are fixed by statute — deposits from sanctions, a $500 million cap, and mandatory disbursement for awards — leaving FTC little discretion over how the fund operates.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Administration requires routine Treasury accounting and fund investment activity, not new enforcement infrastructure or case-by-case adjudication.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility Top 5

Exception

Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if release of the information described in paragraph (1) is required by law, the whistleblower shall receive timely advance notice before such release.

  • Population Scope Low Applies only in the narrow circumstance where a legally compelled disclosure of whistleblower identity is imminent, affecting a tiny subset of whistleblowers.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; the notice requirement imposes only minimal administrative effort.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Low Adds a narrow procedural notice obligation within an existing confidentiality rule — a discrete administrative requirement with no independent substantive legal effect.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Mandates timely advance notice with no agency discretion over whether notice is given, only over the form and timing.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Requires only that advance notice be sent in legally compelled disclosure scenarios — a minimal, infrequent administrative act.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

No possible riders have been surfaced for this bill.

Summary

This bill creates a whistleblower protection and incentive program for people who report potential violations of laws enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It shields workers and others from retaliation and offers financial rewards for tips that lead to successful enforcement actions. Among other elements, the bill * bans employers and other covered entities from punishing people who report suspected violations, participate in investigations, or refuse to take part in illegal conduct; * gives whistleblowers the right to sue in federal court and, if they win, collect triple back pay, reinstatement, and attorney's fees; * requires FTC to pay whistleblowers between 10% and 30% of money collected when their information leads to a successful enforcement action; * creates a dedicated FTC Consumer Protection Fund, capped at $500 million, to pay those awards without needing further congressional approval; * voids non-disclosure and non-compete agreements used to silence potential whistleblowers; * and authorizes FTC to write rules carrying out the new program.

AI-generated summary, pending human review.

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Version Event Date User support Your vote Roll calls
Original
Initial publication
Oct 9, 2026
Oct 9, 2026 No votes yet — —

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 5

Anti-retaliation protections and remedies for whistleblowers

Prohibits employers and covered entities from retaliating against people who report suspected legal violations, take part in investigations, or refuse to participate in unlawful conduct. Whistleblowers who are harmed can sue in federal court for reinstatement, triple back pay, and attorney's fees.

  • Population Scope Medium Directly affects the workforce of all covered entities subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction — a large employer class — plus individual employees who report violations, reaching tens of millions of workers but well under the full U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; litigation costs fall on private parties and existing federal courts, with no new federal spending.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates new substantive law: a federal anti-retaliation prohibition, a private right of action with treble-back-pay remedy, and voidance of arbitration agreements and restrictive covenants — all new statutory mandates binding the regulated population.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Courts apply mandatory 'shall' remedies (reinstatement, triple back pay, fees), leaving little discretion once a violation is established.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Requires standing up recurring federal-court adjudication of retaliation claims, with jury trials, specified burdens of proof, and multi-remedy proceedings — sustained case-by-case enforcement infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Anti-retaliation protections and remedies for whistleblowers

Core Policy Mechanism Top 5

Whistleblower monetary award program (10–30%)

Requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to pay whistleblowers 10–30% of sanctions collected when their tips lead to a successful enforcement action. Sets criteria for award amounts, allows anonymous claims with counsel, bars false-information claimants, and grants appeals to federal court.

  • Population Scope Low Directly benefits only individuals who proactively submit original information leading to a successful Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement action — a narrow, self-selected group far smaller than 10% of the U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Awards of 10–30% of collected sanctions create a recurring federal payment obligation, though actual outlays depend on enforcement volume and are capped indirectly by the $500 million fund balance limit.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new enforceable statutory entitlement to monetary compensation from a federal agency, with specific award criteria, denial rules, and appellate review rights — a new class of substantive legal rights.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium FTC must pay awards within the mandatory 10–30% band but retains judgment in setting the specific percentage based on enumerated factors, blending mandatory obligation with structured discretion.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires FTC to conduct individualized award determinations, process anonymous claims with counsel verification, and defend appellate review in federal courts of appeals — recurring adjudicative load.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Core Policy Mechanism

Whistleblower monetary award program (10–30%)

Implementation & Enforcement Top 5

FTC rulemaking authority to implement the Act

Authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to write rules, through public notice-and-comment, to carry out the whistleblower protection and award program. This gives the FTC flexibility to fill in operational details not spelled out in the legislation.

  • Population Scope Medium Rules issued under this authority will bind the full population of covered entities and potential whistleblowers subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction — a large but not universally nationwide set of actors.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; the provision confers rulemaking authority only.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Grants FTC a new statutory rulemaking authority — a procedural and operational delegation that shapes how substantive rights operate in practice rather than directly creating new substantive rights itself.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted High Broadly authorizes FTC to write any rules 'necessary to carry out' the Act, with no subject-matter limits beyond APA notice-and-comment requirements, conferring wide-ranging delegated authority.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Triggers ongoing notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings and compliance obligations for covered entities as rules are issued — a recurring but agency-managed administrative burden.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement

FTC rulemaking authority to implement the Act

Funding / Appropriations Top 5

FTC Consumer Protection Fund establishment

Creates a dedicated Treasury fund, capped at $500 million, financed by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) monetary sanctions to pay whistleblower awards without further congressional appropriation. Fund balances may be invested in U.S. government obligations.

  • Population Scope Low Directly affects only whistleblower award recipients and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as administering agency — a narrow population far below 10% of the U.S. population.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Medium Creates a permanent, indefinite appropriation funded by FTC-collected sanctions and capped at $500 million, enabling award payments without further congressional action — a material but bounded fiscal commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a new dedicated Treasury fund with a statutory cap and self-executing spending authority — a significant fiscal structure but one that is procedural and administrative rather than creating new substantive rights.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Fund mechanics are fixed by statute — deposits from sanctions, a $500 million cap, and mandatory disbursement for awards — leaving FTC little discretion over how the fund operates.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Administration requires routine Treasury accounting and fund investment activity, not new enforcement infrastructure or case-by-case adjudication.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Funding / Appropriations

FTC Consumer Protection Fund establishment

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility Top 5

Exception

Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if release of the information described in paragraph (1) is required by law, the whistleblower shall receive timely advance notice before such release.

  • Population Scope Low Applies only in the narrow circumstance where a legally compelled disclosure of whistleblower identity is imminent, affecting a tiny subset of whistleblowers.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized or appropriated; the notice requirement imposes only minimal administrative effort.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Low Adds a narrow procedural notice obligation within an existing confidentiality rule — a discrete administrative requirement with no independent substantive legal effect.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Mandates timely advance notice with no agency discretion over whether notice is given, only over the form and timing.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Requires only that advance notice be sent in legally compelled disclosure scenarios — a minimal, infrequent administrative act.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Carve-outs, Exemptions, Eligibility

Exception