HR 10887 — 119th Congress

Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2026

Introduced Oct 22, 2026 Open for voting
Note: Bill summaries and components on this page are AI-generated and may contain errors. Always consult the original bill text and official sources before relying on this information.
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Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 3

Ban on pay-for-delay drug patent settlements

Bans brand-name drug companies and generic drug filers from settling patent disputes by paying the generic company to delay entering the market, with narrow safe harbors for legitimate compensation, early marketing rights, and litigation cost reimbursement. Gives the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) authority to treat pay-for-delay violations as unfair or deceptive acts, issue cease-and-desist orders, pursue civil penalties in federal court, and bring litigation under an expanded section of the FTC Act. Expands mandatory reporting of patent settlement agreements to cover biosimilar drugs and requires a senior company official to file a sworn certification within 30 days that all submitted materials — including side deals and oral agreements — are complete and final.

  • Population Scope Low Directly binds brand-name drug companies and generic or biosimilar filers engaged in patent litigation — a narrow set of pharmaceutical industry actors, not a broad share of the public.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; civil penalties flow to the government but are contingent enforcement receipts, not a budgetary commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new statutory prohibition with binding legal effect across the regulated population, a new enforceable reporting duty with sworn certification, and a newly granted Federal Trade Commission (FTC) litigation and civil-penalty authority — together a substantive restructuring of how patent settlements in drug markets are regulated.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium FTC receives authority to pursue civil penalties and cease-and-desist orders, but the prohibition itself is mandatory ('unlawful'), limiting agency choice on the core question of legality while leaving enforcement prioritization discretionary.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Stands up a new enforcement infrastructure — case-by-case FTC adjudication, federal court litigation authority, civil penalties, sworn-certification compliance obligations, and expanded reporting — imposing recurring burdens on both the agency and regulated companies.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal or amend it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 3

Forfeiture of 180-day generic exclusivity for violations

Generic drug makers who violate the pay-for-delay ban lose their 180-day head-start period in the market — the exclusive window that rewards the first generic filer — as a new consequence under federal drug law.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only first-filer generic drug applicants who hold or seek 180-day market exclusivity and enter prohibited agreements — a small, discrete subset of the pharmaceutical sector.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; loss of market exclusivity is a regulatory consequence, not a budgetary transfer.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to add a new statutory forfeiture trigger, creating a binding new legal consequence — loss of a valuable market entitlement — that did not previously exist for this class of violation.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Forfeiture is automatic upon a qualifying violation finding; no agency discretion is granted over whether to apply it.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to administer a new forfeiture determination on a case-by-case basis when violations are found, adding to its existing generic-drug exclusivity adjudication workload without standing up entirely new infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement Top 3

6-year statute of limitations for FTC enforcement

Sets a 6-year time limit for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to bring enforcement actions over pay-for-delay agreements, starting when the required notice is filed, with an exception preserving enforcement of cease-and-desist orders issued within that window.

  • Population Scope Low Affects the same narrow set of brand-name and generic drug companies already subject to the prohibition, plus the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as enforcement actor — no broader population is directly reached.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; the limitations period constrains enforcement timing without any budgetary commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a procedural constraint on agency enforcement — a fixed filing window with a cease-and-desist exception — that binds FTC conduct rather than changing the substantive prohibition or the underlying legal rights of regulated entities.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The 6-year period is fixed and mandatory; FTC has no discretion to extend or waive it outside the cease-and-desist exception, which is itself rule-bound.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires FTC to track Notice of Agreement filing dates and manage enforcement timelines against a hard deadline, adding procedural compliance overhead without creating new enforcement mechanisms or penalty structures.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

No possible riders have been surfaced for this bill.

Summary

This bill targets "pay-for-delay" deals in the drug industry — agreements where a brand-name drug company pays a generic drug maker to hold off releasing a cheaper version of the same drug. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would gain new powers to stop and punish these deals. Among other elements, the bill * bans brand-name and generic drug companies from settling patent disputes by paying the generic company to delay entering the market; * allows narrow exceptions, such as reimbursing legal costs up to $7.5 million or granting early marketing rights; * requires senior company officials to certify under oath that all submitted settlement materials are complete and final; * strips a generic drug maker of its 180-day head-start period in the market if it violates the new rules; * gives FTC direct authority to sue in federal court and issue cease-and-desist orders; * and sets a 6-year window for FTC to bring enforcement actions after a deal is reported.

AI-generated summary, pending human review.

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Version Event Date User support Your vote Roll calls
Original
Initial publication
Oct 22, 2026
Oct 22, 2026 No votes yet — —

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 3

Ban on pay-for-delay drug patent settlements

Bans brand-name drug companies and generic drug filers from settling patent disputes by paying the generic company to delay entering the market, with narrow safe harbors for legitimate compensation, early marketing rights, and litigation cost reimbursement. Gives the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) authority to treat pay-for-delay violations as unfair or deceptive acts, issue cease-and-desist orders, pursue civil penalties in federal court, and bring litigation under an expanded section of the FTC Act. Expands mandatory reporting of patent settlement agreements to cover biosimilar drugs and requires a senior company official to file a sworn certification within 30 days that all submitted materials — including side deals and oral agreements — are complete and final.

  • Population Scope Low Directly binds brand-name drug companies and generic or biosimilar filers engaged in patent litigation — a narrow set of pharmaceutical industry actors, not a broad share of the public.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; civil penalties flow to the government but are contingent enforcement receipts, not a budgetary commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Creates a new statutory prohibition with binding legal effect across the regulated population, a new enforceable reporting duty with sworn certification, and a newly granted Federal Trade Commission (FTC) litigation and civil-penalty authority — together a substantive restructuring of how patent settlements in drug markets are regulated.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Medium FTC receives authority to pursue civil penalties and cease-and-desist orders, but the prohibition itself is mandatory ('unlawful'), limiting agency choice on the core question of legality while leaving enforcement prioritization discretionary.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden High Stands up a new enforcement infrastructure — case-by-case FTC adjudication, federal court litigation authority, civil penalties, sworn-certification compliance obligations, and expanded reporting — imposing recurring burdens on both the agency and regulated companies.
  • Temporal Commitment High Persists indefinitely until Congress acts to repeal or amend it.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Ban on pay-for-delay drug patent settlements

Regulatory or Legal Changes Top 3

Forfeiture of 180-day generic exclusivity for violations

Generic drug makers who violate the pay-for-delay ban lose their 180-day head-start period in the market — the exclusive window that rewards the first generic filer — as a new consequence under federal drug law.

  • Population Scope Low Affects only first-filer generic drug applicants who hold or seek 180-day market exclusivity and enter prohibited agreements — a small, discrete subset of the pharmaceutical sector.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; loss of market exclusivity is a regulatory consequence, not a budgetary transfer.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth High Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to add a new statutory forfeiture trigger, creating a binding new legal consequence — loss of a valuable market entitlement — that did not previously exist for this class of violation.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low Forfeiture is automatic upon a qualifying violation finding; no agency discretion is granted over whether to apply it.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to administer a new forfeiture determination on a case-by-case basis when violations are found, adding to its existing generic-drug exclusivity adjudication workload without standing up entirely new infrastructure.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Regulatory or Legal Changes

Forfeiture of 180-day generic exclusivity for violations

Implementation & Enforcement Top 3

6-year statute of limitations for FTC enforcement

Sets a 6-year time limit for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to bring enforcement actions over pay-for-delay agreements, starting when the required notice is filed, with an exception preserving enforcement of cease-and-desist orders issued within that window.

  • Population Scope Low Affects the same narrow set of brand-name and generic drug companies already subject to the prohibition, plus the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as enforcement actor — no broader population is directly reached.
  • Budgetary Magnitude Low No funds are authorized, appropriated, or obligated; the limitations period constrains enforcement timing without any budgetary commitment.
  • Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium Establishes a procedural constraint on agency enforcement — a fixed filing window with a cease-and-desist exception — that binds FTC conduct rather than changing the substantive prohibition or the underlying legal rights of regulated entities.
  • Degree of Discretion Granted Low The 6-year period is fixed and mandatory; FTC has no discretion to extend or waive it outside the cease-and-desist exception, which is itself rule-bound.
  • Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Requires FTC to track Notice of Agreement filing dates and manage enforcement timelines against a hard deadline, adding procedural compliance overhead without creating new enforcement mechanisms or penalty structures.
  • Temporal Commitment High Same as above.
No signal yet

Implementation & Enforcement

6-year statute of limitations for FTC enforcement