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Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Balanced Budget Requirement and Biannual Appropriations Process
Requires Congress to adopt a two-year appropriations cycle and pass budgets where spending does not exceed average revenues from the prior three years, with itemized disclosures and 72-hour public notice before any spending vote.
- Population Scope High Every federal program and all U.S. residents are directly affected, as the spending cap constrains the full scope of government outlays.
- Budgetary Magnitude High Capping all federal outlays to a three-year average of revenues would constrain trillions of dollars in annual spending on a permanent, recurring basis.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally mandating a balanced budget creates a new substantive legal obligation on Congress that overrides ordinary legislative discretion over appropriations.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low The balanced budget mandate and 72-hour notice rule use binding 'shall' language throughout, leaving Congress no discretion to waive or modify the core spending cap.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Congress must construct and maintain a biannual appropriations cycle with itemization and public-notice compliance, imposing recurring procedural obligations on every spending bill.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional amendment, the balanced budget and appropriations requirements persist indefinitely and can only be undone by a subsequent constitutional amendment.
No signal yet
Funding / Appropriations Top 5
Budget Stabilization Fund Creation and Management
Requires Congress to establish a budget stabilization fund (BSF) funded at 1 percent of net revenues annually, growing to at least 10 percent of revenues by year ten, withdrawable only for revenue shortfalls or emergencies and subject to a 5-year replenishment requirement.
- Population Scope High All U.S. residents are indirectly affected, as the fund's mandatory deposits and withdrawal restrictions constrain the federal fiscal capacity available for public programs.
- Budgetary Magnitude High Annual deposits of at least 1 percent of net revenues — growing to 10 percent of revenues by year ten — represent a recurring, constitutionally mandated reservation of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally mandating a dedicated reserve fund with binding deposit minimums, restricted withdrawal purposes, and a replenishment duty creates new substantive legal obligations that constrain all future Congresses.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low Deposit minimums, withdrawal purposes, and replenishment timelines are all fixed by mandatory 'shall' language, leaving Congress only the narrow task of defining 'emergency' by statute.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Congress must enact standalone withdrawal-criteria legislation, track replenishment obligations over five-year windows, and meet phased deposit targets, imposing recurring administrative compliance duties.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional provision, the stabilization fund obligation persists indefinitely and cannot be eliminated without a subsequent constitutional amendment.
No signal yet
Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Presidential Budget Submission and Line-Item Veto Authority
Makes the President the chief budget officer responsible for submitting a balanced two-year budget and grants the President a line-item veto over appropriations when projected spending exceeds revenue, overridable only by a three-fourths vote of each chamber.
- Population Scope High Every federal spending program and all beneficiaries of federal appropriations are directly exposed to the line-item veto, which can strike any individual appropriation.
- Budgetary Magnitude High A presidential line-item veto over all appropriations when outlays exceed revenues gives the executive unilateral control over potentially trillions of dollars in spending decisions each cycle.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally designating the President as chief budget officer and granting a line-item veto fundamentally restructures the separation of powers in appropriations, reversing the Supreme Court's holding in Clinton v. City of New York.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The President has broad discretion over which specific provisions to veto when the deficit trigger is met, while Congress retains the ability to override by a three-fourths supermajority.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Each appropriations cycle requires executive review of all line items for deficit compliance and congressional machinery for potential three-fourths override votes, imposing recurring institutional burdens on both branches.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional amendment, the line-item veto authority and budget submission requirement bind the presidency indefinitely and can only be reversed by a subsequent amendment.
No signal yet
Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Debt-Reduction Commission on Taxation and Spending
Creates a standing commission that meets every 10 years to recommend revenue, spending, and budget reforms whenever federal debt exceeds 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with recommendations required to receive a floor vote in both chambers.
- Population Scope High Commission recommendations address federal taxation and spending broadly, affecting all U.S. residents who pay taxes or rely on federal programs.
- Budgetary Magnitude Medium The commission itself carries modest direct cost, but its recommendations target revenue and spending reforms at a scale triggered by debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP, implying very large fiscal stakes.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium The commission imposes a new procedural obligation — mandatory floor consideration of recommendations — without itself enacting substantive fiscal law or binding Congress to adopt any reform.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Congress retains full discretion to reject commission recommendations after floor consideration, and is left to define the commission's composition and operating rules.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Burden is limited to standing up a decennial commission and scheduling floor votes; no new enforcement infrastructure or compliance obligations are created.
- Temporal Commitment High Commission meetings continue until federal debt permanently falls below 60 percent of GDP; given current debt levels, this obligation persists indefinitely absent that threshold being met.
No signal yet
Duration, Sunset, and Review Top 5
Two-Year Delayed Effective Date for Constitutional Amendment
Sets the entire constitutional amendment to take effect two years after ratification, giving Congress and the executive branch time to implement the new budget, appropriations, and veto rules before they become binding.
- Population Scope High The delayed effective date applies uniformly to every provision of the amendment, so its reach spans the same universe of persons and institutions as the amendment itself.
- Budgetary Magnitude Low A timing rule does not itself authorize, appropriate, or obligate any funds; it only delays when the amendment's fiscal constraints become operative.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth Low A transition-period provision changes only when substantive obligations attach, not what those obligations are, making its independent legal depth narrow.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low The two-year window is fixed and non-waivable, granting neither Congress nor the executive any discretion over the activation date.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low No enforcement mechanism or compliance obligation attaches during the transition window; burden arises only when the substantive provisions take effect.
- Temporal Commitment Low The provision self-exhausts at the two-year mark upon ratification, imposing no ongoing obligation thereafter.
No signal yet
No possible riders have been surfaced for this bill.
Summary
This proposed constitutional amendment would require the federal government to keep its budget balanced by limiting spending to no more than average revenue from the prior three years. It creates a biannual appropriations process, a budget stabilization fund (BSF) built up over time as a reserve, and a commission to recommend fixes when national debt exceeds 60 percent of the country's economic output. It also gives the President a line-item veto over spending bills when projected spending exceeds projected revenue, with Congress able to override by a three-fourths vote.
AI-generated summary, pending human review.
| Version | Event | Date | User support | Your vote | Roll calls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Original |
Initial publication
Sep 30, 2026
|
Sep 30, 2026 | No votes yet | — | — |
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Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Balanced Budget Requirement and Biannual Appropriations Process
Requires Congress to adopt a two-year appropriations cycle and pass budgets where spending does not exceed average revenues from the prior three years, with itemized disclosures and 72-hour public notice before any spending vote.
- Population Scope High Every federal program and all U.S. residents are directly affected, as the spending cap constrains the full scope of government outlays.
- Budgetary Magnitude High Capping all federal outlays to a three-year average of revenues would constrain trillions of dollars in annual spending on a permanent, recurring basis.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally mandating a balanced budget creates a new substantive legal obligation on Congress that overrides ordinary legislative discretion over appropriations.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low The balanced budget mandate and 72-hour notice rule use binding 'shall' language throughout, leaving Congress no discretion to waive or modify the core spending cap.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Congress must construct and maintain a biannual appropriations cycle with itemization and public-notice compliance, imposing recurring procedural obligations on every spending bill.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional amendment, the balanced budget and appropriations requirements persist indefinitely and can only be undone by a subsequent constitutional amendment.
No signal yet
Core Policy Mechanism
Balanced Budget Requirement and Biannual Appropriations Process
Funding / Appropriations Top 5
Budget Stabilization Fund Creation and Management
Requires Congress to establish a budget stabilization fund (BSF) funded at 1 percent of net revenues annually, growing to at least 10 percent of revenues by year ten, withdrawable only for revenue shortfalls or emergencies and subject to a 5-year replenishment requirement.
- Population Scope High All U.S. residents are indirectly affected, as the fund's mandatory deposits and withdrawal restrictions constrain the federal fiscal capacity available for public programs.
- Budgetary Magnitude High Annual deposits of at least 1 percent of net revenues — growing to 10 percent of revenues by year ten — represent a recurring, constitutionally mandated reservation of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally mandating a dedicated reserve fund with binding deposit minimums, restricted withdrawal purposes, and a replenishment duty creates new substantive legal obligations that constrain all future Congresses.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low Deposit minimums, withdrawal purposes, and replenishment timelines are all fixed by mandatory 'shall' language, leaving Congress only the narrow task of defining 'emergency' by statute.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Congress must enact standalone withdrawal-criteria legislation, track replenishment obligations over five-year windows, and meet phased deposit targets, imposing recurring administrative compliance duties.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional provision, the stabilization fund obligation persists indefinitely and cannot be eliminated without a subsequent constitutional amendment.
No signal yet
Funding / Appropriations
Budget Stabilization Fund Creation and Management
Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Presidential Budget Submission and Line-Item Veto Authority
Makes the President the chief budget officer responsible for submitting a balanced two-year budget and grants the President a line-item veto over appropriations when projected spending exceeds revenue, overridable only by a three-fourths vote of each chamber.
- Population Scope High Every federal spending program and all beneficiaries of federal appropriations are directly exposed to the line-item veto, which can strike any individual appropriation.
- Budgetary Magnitude High A presidential line-item veto over all appropriations when outlays exceed revenues gives the executive unilateral control over potentially trillions of dollars in spending decisions each cycle.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth High Constitutionally designating the President as chief budget officer and granting a line-item veto fundamentally restructures the separation of powers in appropriations, reversing the Supreme Court's holding in Clinton v. City of New York.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Medium The President has broad discretion over which specific provisions to veto when the deficit trigger is met, while Congress retains the ability to override by a three-fourths supermajority.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Medium Each appropriations cycle requires executive review of all line items for deficit compliance and congressional machinery for potential three-fourths override votes, imposing recurring institutional burdens on both branches.
- Temporal Commitment High As a constitutional amendment, the line-item veto authority and budget submission requirement bind the presidency indefinitely and can only be reversed by a subsequent amendment.
No signal yet
Core Policy Mechanism
Presidential Budget Submission and Line-Item Veto Authority
Core Policy Mechanism Top 5
Debt-Reduction Commission on Taxation and Spending
Creates a standing commission that meets every 10 years to recommend revenue, spending, and budget reforms whenever federal debt exceeds 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with recommendations required to receive a floor vote in both chambers.
- Population Scope High Commission recommendations address federal taxation and spending broadly, affecting all U.S. residents who pay taxes or rely on federal programs.
- Budgetary Magnitude Medium The commission itself carries modest direct cost, but its recommendations target revenue and spending reforms at a scale triggered by debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP, implying very large fiscal stakes.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth Medium The commission imposes a new procedural obligation — mandatory floor consideration of recommendations — without itself enacting substantive fiscal law or binding Congress to adopt any reform.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Medium Congress retains full discretion to reject commission recommendations after floor consideration, and is left to define the commission's composition and operating rules.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low Burden is limited to standing up a decennial commission and scheduling floor votes; no new enforcement infrastructure or compliance obligations are created.
- Temporal Commitment High Commission meetings continue until federal debt permanently falls below 60 percent of GDP; given current debt levels, this obligation persists indefinitely absent that threshold being met.
No signal yet
Core Policy Mechanism
Debt-Reduction Commission on Taxation and Spending
Duration, Sunset, and Review Top 5
Two-Year Delayed Effective Date for Constitutional Amendment
Sets the entire constitutional amendment to take effect two years after ratification, giving Congress and the executive branch time to implement the new budget, appropriations, and veto rules before they become binding.
- Population Scope High The delayed effective date applies uniformly to every provision of the amendment, so its reach spans the same universe of persons and institutions as the amendment itself.
- Budgetary Magnitude Low A timing rule does not itself authorize, appropriate, or obligate any funds; it only delays when the amendment's fiscal constraints become operative.
- Legal / Regulatory Depth Low A transition-period provision changes only when substantive obligations attach, not what those obligations are, making its independent legal depth narrow.
- Degree of Discretion Granted Low The two-year window is fixed and non-waivable, granting neither Congress nor the executive any discretion over the activation date.
- Implementation & Enforcement Burden Low No enforcement mechanism or compliance obligation attaches during the transition window; burden arises only when the substantive provisions take effect.
- Temporal Commitment Low The provision self-exhausts at the two-year mark upon ratification, imposing no ongoing obligation thereafter.
No signal yet
Duration, Sunset, and Review
Two-Year Delayed Effective Date for Constitutional Amendment
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